Charles Davey

Charles acts in personal injury cases for both claimants and defendants, particularly where the facts are contested or the claim raises wider issues of principle or process. He has successfully appealed decisions on the basis that the judge reached a decision that no reasonable judge could have made, as well as overturning costs orders despite a trial judge’s wide discretion on costs.

Recent appeal cases include:

• Woodcock v Chief Constable of Northamptonshire Police [2023] EWHC 1062 (KB) appealed to the Court of Appeal [2025] EWCA Civ, with an application for permission to appeal to the Supreme Court (see below)
• Suffolk County Council v Lyall [2025] EWHC 1032 (KB) Council liable for failing to put anti-slip strips on boardwalks in forest resulting in serious injury
• Mckenzie v Alexander Beds Limited [2024]: (unreported) fundamental dishonesty overturned; indemnity costs and interest awarded against Defendant. The Claimant was an aspiring barrister at the start of her career, having valiantly fought many other struggles, including racial prejudice [can we have a link to her book on Amazon]
• Ruzge & Anor v Ashghar [2024] EWHC 78 (KB) overturning a costs order
• Sternbaum v Dhesi [2016] EWCA Civ 155: repairing obligations of landlords clarified
• Osman v Adan [2016] EWCA Civ 1256: retrial ordered due misunderstanding by judge and failures of both trial Counsel

Charles will identify appealable points, work constructively with solicitors, and distil complex procedural errors into persuasive arguments at appellate level.

Charles built much of his early practice on publicly funded work, particularly in civil actions against the police for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution – often under legal aid when it was more widely available. While the current legal aid landscape limits such work, he remains committed to acting in cases involving misconduct, abuse of power, and systemic injustice, often through direct access instructions.  

Notable work includes:

• A claim for malicious process in obtaining an order for detention
• A civil jury awarding £600,000 in aggravated and exemplary damages to a claimant beaten and falsely arrested by police
• Acting for a claimant repeatedly arrested, prosecuted and assaulted by his police officer neighbour
• Acting for a police officer arrested on suspicion of burglary
• Representing a university professor arrested under the Mental Health Act, with allegations of misfeasance by a force’s professional standards department in investigating his complaint

Charles’s most recent case is that of Woodcock v Chief Constable of Northamptonshire Police [2023] EWHC 1062 (KB): representing a woman seriously injured by her former partner after police failed to telephone to tell her that he was waiting for her outside her home. The police successfully appealed to the Court of Appeal [2025] EWCA Civ 13). Charles has settled Grounds of Appeal to the Supreme Court

Charles has appeared in multi-day employment tribunal hearings covering:

• Unfair dismissal
• Race, sex and disability discrimination
• Whistleblowing and victimisation

His appellate cases include Wieclawski v London Underground UKEAT/0074/17/LA concerning reasonable adjustments and Tara Ellis v Buzzacott UKEAT/00361/10/RN on constructive dismissal and victimisations. Charles’s cases include obtaining a finding of race and sex discrimination by a male of the Claimant’s own race.

He acts for both employers and employees and is particularly interested in belief-based discrimination cases, such as those involving protected philosophical beliefs around gender, healthcare or safeguarding.

Charles is passionate about the rights of complainants in both civil and criminal contexts and is actively engaged in writing and advocacy around women’s rights, policing failures and confidentiality of medical records.

Charles writes on issues related to civil justice and police powers, including:

• Off the Record: Solicitors & Courts Are Often Indifferent to Claimants’ Rights to Confidentiality, New Law Journal, Feb 2025 [link to the article]
• Police Under No Obligation to Warn of Imminent Attack, New Law Journal, 2025 (forthcoming)
• Contributor to: The English of Law, Belin, Paris, 2006

Charles’ ongoing interests include writing and researching issues and themes such as:

• Women’s rights to same sex medical care and how to achieve that
• Civil claims as a route to justice for survivors of gender-based violence
• Male wardens in female prisons. Why are they there?

1. This is a privacy notice that describes how, why and for how long I will process or keep your personal data in accordance with the General Data Protection Regulation (‘GDPR’).
2. The GDPR governs how an individual’s personal data is used, and your rights in relation to that data.
3.  I, Charles Davey, have been instructed by you or your litigation friend (usually a parent), through your solicitor or agent, or via the Bar Pro Bono Unit.
4.  It is necessary for me to process your personal data in order for me to provide you with legal services, for example:

• Advise on the prospects of litigation;
• Advise on the value of your claim;
• Representation at a court hearing;
• Representation at trial;
• Advise, review or comment on legal issues or evidence.

5. Processing means anything done to data such as: recording, organising, adapting, altering, copying, consulting, transmitting, combining, erasing or storing it.

6.The processing for the purposes listed above will take place in accordance with either Article 6(1)(a) GDPR or Article 6(1)(b) GDPR, depending on how you instructed me.

7. If you have instructed me on a direct access basis, or engaged a solicitor (or legal agent), to assist you in bringing or defending a claim then the processing is necessary to perform a contract to which you are a party (Article 6(1)(b) GDPR). To give effect to that contract (i.e. to bring a claim) it is necessary for me to process your personal data for litigation purposes.

8. If I am assisting you on a pro bono basis, it will be necessary for me to seek your consent to be able to represent you (Article 6(1)(a) GDPR). In this scenario, you will be sent a consent form.

Recipients of your data

9.  I may also be required to share your data with others, depending on the nature of your case. This may include:

(i)  Courts and other tribunals to whom documents are presented;

(ii) Your solicitors, or agent representing you, through whom I have been instructed;

(iii) Potential witnesses, experts and other persons involved in the case;

(iv) Solicitors, barristers, or other legal representatives;

(v) Ombudsman and regulatory authorities;

(vi) Education and examining bodies; and

(vii) Current, past or prospective employers.

Special Categories of Data

10.  In some cases I will have been given your personal data that is within the ‘special categories’ of data described in GDPR Article 9(1). For example, personal data that reveals your race, ethnicity, sexual preferences, political or religious beliefs, trade union membership or health. There are also restrictions for processing information regarding criminal convictions.

11. This type of personal data will only be processed where it is necessary in order to represent you in your legal claim, or advise on the prospects of a legal claim.

Retention

12. I will retain your personal data for no longer than is necessary, and where it is possible, I will anonymise your data.

13. How long your personal data is kept will depend on a number of factors. The retention period will be reviewed when the service I am providing you with is complete. However in general, I am obliged by the Bar Code of Conduct to retain records of my cases, and by HM Revenue and Customs to retain records for 6 years.

14. Once your case has concluded and fees have been paid, I shall retain only the personal data necessary for the following purposes:

(i) The legal and professional obligation to retain information relating to my cases;

(ii) To check for any potential conflict of interests that may arise in the future when I am instructed on other cases;

(iii) For use in the defence of potential complaints, legal proceedings or fee disputes;

(iv) To refer back to in future cases which raise similar legal, factual, or procedural issues.

15. The processing for the purposes listed in paragraph 14 (ii), (iii), and (iv) above, will take place in accordance with Article 6(1)(f) GDPR. That is, for the purposes of legitimate interests that are not outweighed by your interests or fundamental rights and freedoms.

16. The processing for the purposes listed in paragraph 14(i) above, will take place in accordance with Article 6(1)(c) GDPR. That is, the processing is necessary for me to comply with a legal obligation. 

Your Rights

17. Where processing of your personal data was based on your consent (see paragraphs 6 and 8) you have the right to withdraw that consent at any time. This does not affect the lawfulness of the processing based on consent before its withdrawal.

18. Withdrawal of your consent to process such data will most likely mean that I am no longer able to provide you with the legal services you seek.

19. You may request confirmation that your personal data is being processed by me and details about the personal data, the source, the processing, the purposes of the processing, the recipients and the retention period.

20. You may request a copy of your personal data that is being processed by me. You may also request rectification (i.e. correction) where there are inaccuracies in the personal data.

21. You have the right to object, on grounds relating to your particular situation, at any time, to processing of your personal data in paragraph 14 of this privacy notice. Should you object, the processing will only continue where there are compelling legitimate grounds for the processing which override your fundamental rights, freedoms and interests. 

22. Where the processing or retention of your data is necessary for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims, it will not be possible to object. 

23. You have the right to request that your personal data is erased where any of the following apply:

(i) The personal data are no longer necessary in relation to the purposes for which they were collected or otherwise processed;

(ii) You withdraw your consent where the basis of processing was based on consent and where there is no other ground for the processing;

(iii) Where your fundamental rights, freedoms and interests override the legitimate interests of processing in paragraph 14;

(iv) The personal data has been unlawfully processed; or

(v) The personal data have to be erased to comply with a legal obligation.

24. You have the right to request that your personal data is restricted from processing, so that it is simply stored, for the following reasons: as an alternative to deletion; so that it can be corrected; for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims; to verify if a legitimate ground exists (paragraph 14).

25. Where it is necessary to correct your personal data, or you have requested the restriction or erasure of your personal data, I shall endeavour to contact the recipients of the personal data, unless this involves disproportionate effort. 

Security

26. I take appropriate physical and technical procedures to safeguard your personal data to prevent it from being accidentally lost, used or accessed in an unauthorised way. 

Complaints or Queries

27. If you have any questions regarding this privacy notice, or how I use your personal data please email me: mailto: charles.davey@tbgbarrister.co.uk, or my clerks: clerking@thebarristergroup.co.uk telephone 01823 247 247.

28. I shall aim to respond as soon as possible, and within 30 days.

29. You have the right to complain to the Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) if you believe I have not handled your request in an appropriate manner. For information on contacting the ICO please go to: https://ico.org.uk/global/contact-us/